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As a useful adjunct to other macroeconomic accounts, 
this paper describes financial flows between different 
sectors of the Indian economy from 1955 to 2015. It finds 
that the consolidated government sector has the largest 
net deficit, while the households sector has the largest 
net surplus. The private corporate sector is running 
larger deficits than at any other time in the past, implying 
more reliance on external credits. With liberalisation and 
globalisation, the rest of the world sector is now the 
second-largest net surplus sector in the economy. 
1 Flow of Funds
Capitalism is a fi nancial system. Every entity in the eco nomy, whether an individual, a household, a business, or a state institution, faces monetary constraints in the sense 
that cash-infl ow and cash-outfl ow operations form a key set 
of conditioning factors on behaviour. Depending on the  extent 
to which an entity effectively manages these fl ows, it faces 
greater or fewer liquidity and solvency constraints. In periods 
of generalised crisis, it is the network of these constraints that 
fi rst become noticeable as being under threat.1 There is now an 
increasing recognition that fi nancial operations and money 
fl ows, rather than being just a “veil” refl ecting “real” fl ows, 
have an independent existence that determine economic out-
comes (Mehrling 2012). Money fl ows, from this viewpoint, are 
autonomous but shape real outcomes. Put another way, money 
fl ows may or may not correspond tightly with “real” fl ows of 
expenditure, but may be greatly important to understanding 
the macroeconomy (for example, households may borrow to 
accumulate assets, and though this does not result in in-
creased consumption or investment, it does have effects on the 
fragility of the fi nancial system).
From such a perspective, an effective accounting structure 
for the evolution of an economy needs to capture the pattern, 
duration, and timing of money fl ows within it. This was 
an  insight Morris Copeland (1952) had and his inspiration 
for  creating “fl ow of funds” (FoF) accounts in the United 
States (US). The FoF accounts measure fi nancial fl ows and 
commitments across sectors of the economy, tracking funds 
as they move from net surplus sectors to net defi cit sectors, 
which use them for current expenditure or to acquire physical 
and fi nancial  assets. Examining these provides a simple 
but effective portrait of the nature of fi nancial claims in an 
economy, and acts as a very useful adjunct to the national 
income accounts to understand its current and likely future 
trajectories.
In this paper, we provide such a portrait of the Indian economy 
from 1955 to 2015 using the country’s underused FoF accounts 
data. We undertake a broad-brush portrait of the sources and 
uses of funds, and the evolution of the fi nancial instruments 
issued over the period. The key features that emerge are as 
follows:
(i) The consolidated government sector is the largest net defi -
cit sector and households are the largest net surplus sector.
(ii) Since liberalisation, while the fi nancial defi cits of the gover n-
ment exceed the defi cits of the private corporate sector (PCS) 
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in most years, the PCS has been running larger defi cits as a 
fraction of gross domestic product (GDP) than in the past. 
(iii) The rest of the world (RoW) has moved to becoming the 
second-largest net surplus sector in the economy.
(iv) The pattern of fi nancing for the large defi cit sectors varies 
substantially with the PCS still relying on bank-based loans 
and advances rather than market-based  security issuances to 
undertake expenditure.
(v) Sectoral transfers have changed over time. For example, 
the PCS relies much more heavily on households and the RoW 
for their fi nancing now than in the past.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. In Section 2 we 
briefl y explain the background of FoF, and how it is in India. 
Section 3 provides an overview of the net surplus and defi cit 
sectors from 1955 to 2015, and the evolution of patterns of 
funding. The fi nal section uses these fi ndings to provide 
 pathways for further research and understanding.
2 Background
The FoF approach traces its roots back to the work of Copeland 
in the late 1940s. Titled “Tracing Money Flows through the 
United States Economy” (1947), his paper laid the foundation 
for this method of analysis, which was further developed in his 
book in 1952. Since microdata on every transaction are not 
available, Copeland suggested that we divide the economy 
into several key institutional sectors and account for aggregate 
money fl ows between each sector. The resultant FoF model 
consists of a set of interrelated sectoral balance sheets, each 
containing the credits and debits to the sector. Typically, FoF 
data contain two sets of balance sheets—aggregate fl ows of 
assets (“Uses”) and liabilities (“Sources”) for all sectors, and 
the composition of assets issued and held by each sector, listed 
by fi nancial instrument.
The fi rst principle of fi nancial accounting is that, for any 
economic unit, total sources of funds must equal total uses of 
funds and that these must tally across sectors. While there 
are many ways of organising accounts, this equality must 
always hold. Organising accounts with this principle in mind 
allows for a deeper understanding of the level of fi nancial 
activity and the extent to which surplus units are experienc-
ing a net accumulation of assets, while net defi cit units expe-
rience a net  accumulation of liabilities. These can serve to 
provide some indication of the fi nancial fragility of any sector 
or unit. Macro-economic analyses based on understanding 
“sectoral balances” have been used to assess the structure 
of economies, their  potential evolution, and their propensity 
for fragility (see, among others, Godley and Cripps 1983; 
Godley 1999).
As noted, the relevance of this type of analysis is arguably 
higher in a liberalised or “de-repressed” fi nancial system where 
balance sheets can evolve more freely (in a system of  fi nancial 
controls and repression, fi nancial balances are constrained to 
follow real activity in predictable ways). Financial deregula-
tion, the opening of national economies to global capital fl ows, 
and increasingly fl uid and diverse forms of fi nancial capital 
imply that many critical dimensions of economic activity 
 embodied and refl ected in fi nancial markets are not adequately 
captured by traditional measures such as GDP.
2.1 India
Given the complexities of data collection, somewhat surprisingly, 
India has one of the most extensive and current sets of data on 
money fl ows among developing countries. We owe this to the 
Union Finance Minister in 1955, C D Deshmukh, who supported 
the idea of having money fl ow accounts. The  Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) has been publishing FoF data since 1967, with the data 
stretching back to 1951–52 and the most recent release covering 
2014–15. Very few have attempted to use the RBI’s data in recent 
years, with only a handful of  researchers publishing papers or 
articles on the subject. Earlier work using Indian FoF data can be 
found in Bhatt (1971), Sen et al (1996), Sen and Vaidya (1997), 
Green et al (2000, 2002), and Moore (2007), among others.
Despite the availability of data, there have been no descriptive 
accounts on the evolution of the FoF in the last two  decades, other 
than periodic reports of the RBI. Given the changes in the Indian 
economy because of fi nancial deregulation, fi nancial develop-
ment, and global dislocations such as  fi nancial crises, such an 
exercise may be useful now. Since the early 1990s, there has been 
a sea change in the functioning of Indian fi nancial markets with 
a host of new institutions and regulations, including a revolu-
tion in capital markets, the entry of private banks, changed RBI 
regulatory norms, increased  capital infl ows from abroad, and so 
on.2 For our basic analysis, we compare the pre-liberalisation 
and post-liberalisation  fi nancial accounts in greater detail. 
2.2 Data
FoF data are provided online in matrix form, with columns 
representing sectors, and rows representing either a sector, or an 
instrument.3 Sample tables of both sector-wise and instrument-
wise FoF data are included in Figure 1 (p 51).
Each column (sector) is further divided into two sub- 
columns—“Sources” and “Uses.” As per RBI defi nitions, “the 
sources column provides data on funds available to the specifi c 
sector, raised from other sectors,” while the uses column 
 “represents the sector’s investment in fi nancial assets and net 
increases in fi nancial assets over the period covered in the 
 accounts.” Theoretically, in the aggregate, total sources and 
total uses should balance. However, in practice, this is rarely 
achieved, partly due to “lags in the availability of information 
and partly due to inadequate quality of data” (RBI 2000).
The economy is divided into the following sectors, based 
on institutional structure and activity status: (i) Banking, 
(ii) other fi nancial institutions (OFI), (iii) private corporate 
sector (PCS), (iv) government, (v) rest of the world (RoW), 
and (vi) households.
The banking sector includes the RBI, commercial banks, 
 coo perative banks, and credit societies. The OFI sector contains 
fi nancial corporations and companies, and insurance, while the 
PCS includes non-credit societies and non-government non-
fi nancial companies. The government sector  includes central 
and state governments, as well as their departmental com-
mercial undertakings, local authorities, and “non-departmental 
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non-fi nancial commercial undertakings” (for example, state 
electricity boards). 
The RoW sector contains all international institutions, inclu-
ding the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Org-
anization (WTO), and Asian Development Bank (ADB), among 
others. The household sector is a residual sector, comprising 
“the individuals, non-government non-corporate ent e r prises of 
farm/fi rm business and non-farm/fi rm business, like sole proprie-
torships and partnerships, trusts and non-profi t institutions” (RBI 
2000). Having noted this, communication with the RBI suggested 
that while the household sector is “technically” a residual sector, 
balances are calculated from the Central Statistics Offi ce (CSO) 
estimates of household saving. So, the sectoral balances do not 
add up, and there is need for a “not elsewhere classifi ed” sector.
For the instrument-wise data, fi nancial instruments are 
grouped into the following categories:
(i) Currency and deposits
(ii) Investment, which includes
 (a) Government securities
 (b) Other government securities
 (c) Corporate securities
 (d) Bank securities
 (e) OFI securities
 (f) Foreign securities
 (g) Others
(iii) Loans and advances
(iv) Small savings
(v)  Life fund
(vi)  Provident fund
(vii) Compulsory deposits
(viii) Trade debt
(ix) Foreign claims not elsewhere classifi ed
(x)  Other items not elsewhere classifi ed.
The RBI sources most data from official publications such as 
the RBI Bulletin, government reports, and company annual re-
ports to construct the FoF tables on an annual basis. Detailed 
sources for all data are provided in RBI (2000). A comprehen-
sive account of the methodology followed for data compilation 
in every sector can also be found in the same document.
Apart from some discrepancies at the aggregate level, the FoF 
data are subject to certain other limitations. Data are colle ct ed 
using samples and then scaled up to generate aggregate fi gures 
Figure 1: Sample Flow of Funds Tables 
Statement 1.44: Financial Flows—Instrument-wise, 1994–95  (` crore)
Instrument/Sector  Banking  Other Financial  Private Corpo-  Government Rest of the  Households Total  Discrepancy
  Institutions  rate Business   World
   Sources  Uses  Sources  Uses  Sources  Uses Sources  Uses  Sources  Uses  Sources Uses  Sources Uses  (Sources— 
                 Uses)
  (1 ) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) (13) (14) (15)  (16)
1 Currency and deposits 96,408  1,530  9,045  1,269  2,696  7,705  11,372  1,629  -5,970  -1,921  – 83,297  1,13,551 93,509  20,042
2 Investments  4,899  14,120  26,593  46,774  41,831  8,833  27,063  2,453 13,700  15,420  – 17,474  1,14,086  1,05,074  9,012 
 a Central and state govt securities  –  19,518  –  20,835  – 529  25,186  – – -29  – 23  25,186  40,876  -15,690 
 b Other govt securities  – -2,146  – -644  – – 1,877  – – – – 175  1,877  -2,615  4,492 
 c Corporate securities  –  2,787 – 18,875  41,831  – – 588 –  15,449  – 8,538  41,831  46,237  -4,406 
 d  Bank securities  4,899  –  – -5,019  – 239  – -469  – – – 140  4,899  -5,109  10,008
 e OFI securities   –  -1,343  26,593 –  – 7,772  – 877  – – – 8,598  26,593  15,904  10,689 
 f Foreign securities  –  -4,643  – 61  – 197  – – 13,700  – – – 13,700  -4,385  18,085
 g Others  – -53  – 12,666  – 96  – 1,457  –  – – – – 14,166 -14,166
3  Loans and advances 9,394  57,010  11,523  34,997  50,742  23,856  9,808  4,455  – 5,196  24,770  – 1,06,237 1,25,514 -19,277
4 Small savings  – – – 165  – –  13,269  – – – – 13,140  13,269  13,269 –
5 Life fund  – –  10,298  – – – 1,125  – – 53  – 11,370  11,423  11,423 –
6 Provident fund  – – – – – – 8,856  – – – – 21,295  21,295  21,295 –
7 Compulsory deposits  -10  – – – – – – – – – – -10  -10  -10 –
8 Trade debt – – 534 – -1,682 – 435 -1,068 – – – -1,149 -713 -2,217 1,504
9 Foreign claims ne classified –  24,320 – – – – – 46 -6,309 1,922 – – -6,309 26,288 -32,597
10 Other items ne classified 2,449  856 6,424 2,705 16,597 490 -121 -438 – – – – 25,349 3,613 21,736
Total   1,13,140  97,836  76,856  85,910  1,10,184  40,884 71,807 7,077 1,421 20,670  24,770   1,45,381  3,98,178  3,97,758  420
Source: Report on Currency & Finance, Volume II 1997–98.
Statement 2.44: Financial Flows—Sector-wise,  1994–95  (` crore)
 Banking  Other Financial  Private Corpo-  Government Rest of the  Households Total  
  Institutions  rate Business   World
   Sources  Uses  Sources  Uses  Sources  Uses Sources  Uses  Sources  Uses  Sources Uses  Sources Uses
  (1 ) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) (13) (14) (15) 
1 Banking – – 3,295  -2,704  32,889 4,188  22,008 908  13,700  -5,506  21,618  71,524  93,510  68,410
2 OFIs  13,293  -331  –  – 30,876 7,772  17,917 1,598  -23  7,920  2,409  38,426  64,472  55,385
3 PCS 2,650  35,423  22,287  30,080 – – -7  2,208 –  16,842 326  10,639  25,256  95,192
4 Government 11,237  16,016  1,569  43,021  2,390  4,285  – –  -5,957 -533  417  24,792 9,656  87,626
5 RoW 3,609  19,677 828  -183  13,491 197  5,475  345 –  – –  – 23,403  20,036
6 Households 71,524  21,618  38,426  2,409  10,639  326  24,792 417  – – – – 1,45,381  24,770
7 Sector ne classified 10,827  5,388  10,451  13,287  19,899  24,116  1,622  1,601  -6,299  1,947  – -  36,500  46,339
8 Total  1,13,140  97,836  76,856  85,910  1,10,184  40,884  71,807  7,077  1,421  20,670  24,770  1,45,381  3,98,178  3,97,758
 Sources—uses 15,304  -9,054  69,300  64,730  -19,249 – 1,20,611  420 
Source: Report on Currency & Finance, Volume II 1997–98.
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for each sector due to the unavailability of detailed  micro-level 
data. Flows for most sectors are obtained as the difference be-
tween outstanding positions at the end of each fi nancial year 
as opposed to “actual” fl ows (apart from the household sector). 
These fl ows are not bifurcated into transactions, revaluations 
(capital gains/losses, changes owing to movements in the ex-
change rate, and so on), and other changes in volume account 
(for example, write-offs) due to non-availability of data. Finally, 
because these fl ows are estimated, they may not tally with other 
published data to which they are  expected to correspond.
Frustratingly, official data on levels are not published along 
with fl ows. While data on levels must exist to compute differences 
between outstanding positions, we have been unable to access 
such data despite repeated requests to the RBI.4
3 Evolution of Indian Sectoral Balances
3.1 Overall Story
The basic story of Indian FoF is told in Figures 2a and 2b. The lines 
show the net defi cit position of each sector as the difference 
between sources of funds and uses of funds. If infl ows exceed out-
fl ows, the sector has added more to the claims on itself for that 
year than it has added to the claims it has on other sectors. Fig-
ure 2a provides these positions in nominal terms, and Figure 2b 
depicts the same graph normalised by gross domestic income. 
Further, the fi gures show that there has been increasing use of 
fi nancial markets since net  positions are larger as a fraction of GDP. 
This is seen more easily in Figure 3a, which provides the fi nance 
ratio (total sources/GDP) for the period. Clearly, this measure 
has increased over time. It stands at around 60% of GDP now.
From 1955 to the late 1980s, the direction and use of funds 
was quite straightforward. The government sector ran net 
defi  cits throughout the period, with an acceleration from about 
5% of GDP to about 10% of GDP from the 1980s to the mid-1990s. 
After the period of liberalisation, its net defi cit was more volatile, 
decreasing before it increased again in the early 2000s, with 
another cycle to follow in the succeeding decade. The PCS was 
the other major net defi cit sector, running defi cits of around 
2%–5% of GDP starting in the 1970s, which was decidedly smaller 
than the government’s till the period of liberalisation. Follow-
ing liberalisation, the  PCS began to run much higher and more 
volatile defi cits, regularly to the order of 8% of GDP. It appears 
that the PCS’s defi cit now mirrors that of the government.
Banking and other fi nancial institutions have, as may be 
 expected, not taken very sharp net positions. This was especially 
true of the period before liberalisation. After the 1990s and the 
deepening of fi nancial markets, they have been more willing to 
take larger net defi cit or surplus positions, but almost never of very 
signifi cant magnitudes (in the order of 2%–3% of GDP on average).
The household sector is the largest net surplus sector. It 
should be remembered that household balances are counted 
as a residual and that the fi gures are not derived from any 
 underlying balance sheets. With this caveat, the household 
sector ran increasing surpluses in the period from 1950 to 
1990. Since then, it has maintained a relatively steady yearly 
net surplus of about 10% of GDP. Most interestingly, the RoW 
has moved in the last few years to being the second-largest net 
surplus sector (substantially higher than both banking and 
other fi nancial institutions) at nearly 4% of GDP.5
3.1.1 Caveats and Checks
While the fi gures tell a story that is consistent with broad expecta-
tions, it should be noted that there may be considerable noise due 
to statistical discrepancies. While aggregate sources should be 
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Figure 2a: Sectoral Balances for All Sectors (` crore)
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equal to aggregate uses, in practice this is not the case. As Figure 3b 
(p 52) shows, the difference between sources and uses can be 
substantial, especially after 2000 when these  fi gures reach 10% 
of GDP in one year. Nevertheless, we can only go with the pub-
lished data from the RBI, which suggest these levels of uncertainty.
The FoF makes little to no attempt to reconcile its implied 
fl ows with national accounts statistics. In theory, one should ex-
pect a rough correspondence between the defi cit of a sector, as 
measured by the difference in fl ows in national accounts, and 
the net fl ows into the sector, as measured by the FoF, since the 
defi cit of that sector will need to be fi nanced. In other words, if 
there is, say, a current account defi cit, we should  expect to see a 
net surplus accruing to the RoW. Similarly, to run a government 
defi cit, we should expect to see a corresponding net surplus of 
other agents to the government of the same magnitude. 
To examine this, in Figure 4b we plot the current account 
balance (from national accounts statistics) and compare it with 
the RoW sectoral balance from the FoF. There is very close cor-
respondence. In Figure 4a we undertake the same exercise 
with the gross fi scal defi cit (as measured by  national accounts) 
and the government sectoral balance. Here, while there is a 
rough correspondence between the series, there is one period, 
the middle 2000s, in which this breaks down. Assessing the 
reasons for this would be an important task for government 
statisticians. Taken together, however, these fi gures suggest that 
there is broad correspondence  between FoF and other meas-
ures of the evolution of economic activity.
3.2 Deficit Sectors
Figure 5a provides an indication of the major sources of funding 
of the government’s net defi cit position. In the pre-liberalisation 
period, banking was by far the largest source of funding for 
the government, with annual transfers of about 4%–6% of 
GDP. This was in keeping with the captive banking of nation-
alisation. Since liberalisation, however, the government began 
to rely on other fi nancial institutions and also households’ direct 
purchase of government claims. Thus, for example, through 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, households and other fi nancial 
institutions contributed between 3% and 7% of GDP in terms of 
 annual sources of funds for the government. With the deepening 
of fi nancial markets and the development of capital markets, 
other fi nancial institutions now rival banking as the main 
source of funding for the state.
The RoW accounts for as much as 2% of GDP in sources of 
funding to the government.  Figure 5b provides an indication 
of the break-up of instruments used by the government to 
borrow. Government securities were the most common instru-
ment, certainly from the late 1970s, accounting for 20% to 
80% of all sources. Again, this is broadly in keeping with the 
idea that several sectors, including OFIs and banks, possess 
government securities to a larger amount than may have been 
expected, primarily because of regulations coercing them to 
do so (Shah and Patnaik 2011). The “other” category includes 
currency and deposits, small savings, life funds, provident 
funds, trade debt and other items not elsewhere classifi ed. 
Loans and advances (that is, direct borrowing from banks, has 
fallen signifi cantly from the mid-1970s when they accounted 
for nearly 50% of all sources).
The PCS’s net defi cit position is very  differently constructed. 
First, the net defi cits were about half the size of the government 
sector till the period of liberalisation. As Figure 6a (p 54)
shows, the sector has relied signifi cantly on both banking and 
other fi nancial institutions to fi nance itself since the 1990s. 
Between 2005 and 2008, the sector began to issue claims that 
Figure 4b: Rest of the World Sectoral Balance vs Current Account Balance,
Normalised by GDP
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Figure 5a: Sources for the Government Sectorm, Normalised by GDP
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Figure 5b: Sources for the Government Sector, by Instrument
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were fi nanced by banks at an unprecedented level (at its 
highest, 8% of GDP in one year). This is the same period that 
was described as a debt-led cyclical bubble by  Nagaraj (2013). 
Since the peak of 2008, the PCS has reduced its reliance on 
banking. 
It is in this period that we see the fi rst sign of the RoW be-
coming an important source of funds (in the order of 3%–4% 
of GDP for the sector as a whole). After 2010, the PCS’s funding 
came primarily from households. While this spike may indeed 
be the case, it is also possible that we may be observing fl ows that 
have not been accurately  captured elsewhere. In either case, 
the PCS became much less reliant on traditional sources of 
banking and other fi nancial institutions after 2010. Figure 6b 
depicts the instruments used by the PCS for  funding. Unlike 
the government sector, loans and advances constitute the 
largest source of funds for the PCS, roughly half of all instru-
ments. Despite market deepening, corporate securities account 
for about 10% to 20% of sources before liberalisation and 
roughly the same after that period (with an occasional spike).
3.3 Surplus Sectors
The household sector is the main surplus sector. Figure 7a 
 provides a break-up of the uses of funds from the sector over 
time as a fraction of GDP. Throughout the period in question, 
there has been an increase in household surpluses, suggesting 
an increase in fi nancial savings over time. The household 
 sector’s funds were primarily provided to the banking sector, 
at an annual rate of slightly below 5% of GDP, from the 1970s 
till the 1990s. There has been a marked increase after that, 
averaging around 8%. 
The second-largest use of household funds is to obtain 
 instruments from the OFI  category (health and life insurance, 
and pension funds). These now account for about 3%–5% of 
GDP in terms of annual claims obtained by the household 
 sector. The fi gure also suggests that households may consider 
OFIs and government claims as broad substitutes, since these 
appear to vary inversely with each  other. Figure 7b provides 
a break-up of the allocation of the household portfolio 
across various instruments. What is  evident is a remarkable 
stability in this portfolio. Over the last 50 years, roughly 60% 
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of household funds go to deposits and currency (with some 
notable  exceptions). Funds going to other fi nancial institutions 
are  divided between provident funds, life funds, and OFI secu-
rities. Again, these are relatively stable as a fraction of overall 
uses—ranging from 5% to 20% of all uses.
The other increasingly important surplus sector is the RoW. 
As Figure 8a (p 54) shows, this was an insignifi cant source till 
the late 1990s, but it has been a large source of funds since 
that for the PCS (and to a much smaller extent, the banking 
sector). The RoW provides around 4%–8% of GDP in funds to 
the corporate sector from roughly around nothing before 
2000. Figure 8b (p 54) provides a break-up of the portfolio of 
the RoW. Before 2000, its portfolio consisted of loans and ad-
vances, and currency and deposits. Since then, the portfolio is 
almost entirely in  corporate securities.6 These observations 
suggest a dramatic and somewhat under-appreciated fact 
about private debt  markets—the RoW is now a major player 
rivalling other fi nancial institutions and banking as the pre-
ferred source of funds.
3.4 Banking and Capital Markets
We now turn to the banking sector. As might be expected, 
 given its centrality in liquidity transformation, banks do not 
take large positions. As Figure 9a shows, sources and uses 
closely evolve together. Figure 9c shows the evolution of the 
uses of banking funds over the period. The two main uses are 
for funding the two principal defi cit sectors, government and 
the PCS (the other sectors are not shown). In the late 2000s, 
the PCS became the  primary use of banking funds. More im-
portantly, while banks are most reliant on households, in the 
recent past, the RoW has become an important source as well. 
As Figure 9b shows, banks now obtain funds equivalent to 
roughly 2% of GDP from the RoW, from virtually nothing as 
 recently as 2010.
It is important to acknowledge that despite the continued 
centrality of banking, India is moving towards greater  reliance 
on capital markets rather than banking intermediaries. This is 
seen most clearly in Figure 10, which depicts the difference 
between loans and advances on the one hand and securities 
on the other as sources of funds, normalised by GDP. In the 
period before liberalisation, loans and  advances typically 
 accounted for a larger fraction of sources (bars above the axis), 
but since then, securities account for the larger fraction (bars 
below the axis) in almost every year.
4 Conclusions
We have provided a broad summary of the evolution of the 
 Indian fi nancial system over the last 60 years. India is quite 
unique among developing countries in having such an accoun t-
ing framework, but it remains woefully underused by analy sts 
and policymakers. However, as with any other exercise in data 
collection, there are caveats that must be made on the quality 
and reliability of data. 
As described at the outset, much of the data must be 
imputed from samples, some data is calculated from residuals, 
and stock data is not available (although fl ows are calculated 
as differences between stock positions). Given the difficulties 
of calculating these data, there are somewhat signifi cant 
statistical discrepancies and it would be somewhat foolhardy 
to  assume very precise estimates. Nevertheless, the FoF 
Figure 9a: Sources and Uses for the Banking Sector, Normalised by GDP
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Figure 9b: Sources for the Banking Sector from Rest of the World 
and Households, Normalised by GDP
-0.02 
0 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
0.1 
19
55
 
19
58
 
19
61
 
19
64
 
19
67
 
19
70
 
19
73
 
19
76
 
19
79
 
19
82
 
19
85
 
19
88
 
19
91
 
19
94
 
19
97
 
20
00
 
20
03
 
20
06
 
20
09
 
20
13
 
Figure 10: Total Sources (Loans/Advances)—Total Sources (Investments), 
Normalised by GDP  (Mean of marketshift)
0.05
0
-0.05
-0.1
 1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010
Banking Sources: RoWBanking Sources: HH
Banking Uses: Government
Banking Uses: PCS
SPECIAL ARTICLE
may 6, 2017 vol liI no 18 EPW  Economic & Political Weekly56
does provide a very useful framing and accounting tool to 
understand macroeconomic history. At the very least, ac-
counts of the macroeconomic evolution of the Indian economy 
should not be too different from the accounting identities pre-
sented in the FoF accounts.
This paper provides some useful insights that complicate 
some narratives. They can be summarised as follows. First, 
the household sector is the largest net surplus sector. House-
holds have seen their collective fi nancial surpluses rise to 
about 10% of GDP year on year. This suggests that, on aggre-
gate, one should not expect households to experience severe 
fi nancial strains, as is sometimes stated as a matter of great 
concern (the household debt bubble). Of course, here too the 
distribution of assets and liabilities within the household sec-
tor is likely to matter, but, in aggregate, households’ balance 
sheets are not stressed.
Second, despite substantial changes in fi nancial markets in 
terms of regulations and new instruments, there is remark-
able stability in patterns of fi nancing. Households have main-
tained roughly the same portfolio balance between deposits 
and  other instruments throughout the period. Although there 
are newer instruments, particularly the stock market and 
convenient savings devices such as systematic investment 
plans (SIPs), in aggregate, there has been very little change in 
the portfolio balance of households. Similarly, despite the 
development of capital markets, private corporate businesses 
rely on loans and advances more extensively than on debt in-
struments, and the reverse is true for the other major defi cit 
sector, the government. 
But this does not mean that there have been no changes at 
all. Most interestingly, in the last fi ve years, the RoW has 
become one of the more important sectors. It is  currently the 
second-largest surplus sector in the economy. It has become 
one of the main sources of funds for the PCS and has begun to 
be a net creditor to the banking sector as well. The globalisation 
of fi nance in India really began fairly late in the liberalisation 
process, but may now have taken greater hold.
This simple accounting approach allows us a framing that ac-
counts for money fl ows and gives us very useful anchoring. But 
this leaves open several questions that need to be asked about the 
relationship between fi nancial positions and current expenditure 
on goods and services. It is clear from our framing that nominal 
government debt and private corporate debt would be rising 
through the period because they were both net defi cit sectors 
(whether the debt–income ratios of the sector were rising is 
another question, which is difficult to answer without stock data). 
The question of why an economic unit had rising debt over a 
period is often treated as equivalent to the question of why its 
expenditure was higher relative to its income in that period. 
This is shorthand, but it can be misleading. Logically, funding 
for a sector can be used for myriad purposes, including to 
 obtain assets, maintain cash balances, and undertake expen-
diture (see Mason and Jayadev 2014, 2015 on why rising debt is 
not equivalent to rising expenditure). Understanding how the 
fi nancial positions of various sectors have been linked (or not) 
to patterns of expenditure and sectoral growth rates is an 
 obvious next step for research, but one that is beyond the 
 purview of the current exercise.
notes
1   This was a key insight of Hyman Minsky (1964), 
which became a cornerstone of his understand-
ing of capitalist crises.
2   For a review of these, see Shah and Patnaik 
(2011) and Allen et al (2007).
3   See https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Pu blicati-
o ns/PDFs/15426.pdf.
4   Further, instrument-wise data was aligned with 
System of National Accounts (SNA) 2008, star-
ting from 2011–12. Six years later, data from 
1955 to 2010 have not yet been rebased to con-
form to the new standards, and hence cannot 
be used in conjunction with newer data.
5   This has been more systematically occurring 
around the world. Some have expressed the 
concern that those focusing on balance of 
payment crises are fi ghting the last war by 
focusing on sovereign foreign currency bor-
rowing, rather than private borrowing (see 
Rey 2015).
6   Note that when the fraction of the portfolio go-
ing to an instrument is greater than one, it 
means that there is a negative balance that 
year in one or more of the other instruments.
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